International Reserves Accumulation
in Emerging Countries with Flexible Exchange Rates
Patricia Rodríguez* and Omar Ruiz**
Date submitted: July29, 2011. Date accepted: January 27, 2012
Abstract

The accumulation of international reserves on the part of emerging countries stands out as one of the most relevant aspects of monetary and financial imbalances today. Among such nations, Latin Americans are reaching new, historic levels. No theoretical or empirical intervention model exists that can explain or justify this enormous accumulation, which in the end, merely reveals new ways of transferring value from less developed to developed countries. Emerging countries undertake activities within the international monetary system, which has the dollar and other strong currencies as a base, seeking to accumulate large amounts of currencies as a precautionary measure to administer their exchange markets. In so doing they strengthen their expectation management policy with regard to meeting inflation targets.

Keywords: monetary policy, currencies, exchange rate, international reserves.
INTRODUCTION

This article has two specific objectives. Firstly to show that the large volume of international reserves is a response to the monetary instability created by the US dollar's position as the world's unit of account. Related to this situation, central banks are deciding to establish a policy on inflation targets, thus forcing them to intervene on their exchange markets to minimize inflation pass-through. The second objective is to show some of the most familiar methods and models used to establish optimal levels of international reserves, and how these levels have been outstripped, since they fail to explain the excessively large volumes of international reserves. As an example, the results of the Wijnholds-Kapteyn model are given in relation to four Latin American countries.

The article is divided into six sections: the first explains how the US dollar, as the international reserve currency, causes instability in the international monetary system. The second explains why central banks have decided to raise their international reserves without moderation. The third demonstrates the disproportion in the levels of international reserve held by developed countries on the one hand, and by developing countries on the other. The fourth describes theoretical considerations on the level of optimal reserves. The fifth details the evolution of variables, composite indicators and models that have previously been used to determine optimal reserve levels. The sixth examines the numerical results of the Wijnholds-Kapteyn model, and how they conflict with the real reserve values of the four Latin American economies in question: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. The final section offers some general conclusions.

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MONETARY RESERVES

The 2008 financial crisis caused a negative impact on global trade, creating major imbalances in international financial and trade accounts. Therefore, developing nations are now trying to minimize the costs and effects of their balances of payments in various ways; this has led to a series of protectionist measures such as the increase in their respective international reserves, foreign exchange interventions, etc., which hardly help to close –and in fact widen– the gap between developed and developing countries.

Furthermore, the weaknesses in the international monetary system are closely interconnected with the US dollar's role as the global unit of account, as well as the capacity of the system itself to address the liquidity problem, and this has a direct repercussion on the increasing levels of foreign reserve assets held by emerging countries.

The asymmetry between countries with deficits and those with surpluses in their balances of payments, as well as that between the country that issues the international reserve currency and the rest of the world, creates adjustment problems that arise essentially due to their reluctance to implement monetary policies to maintain a real price for their respective currencies and not keeping them overvalued in order to prevent inflation pass-through. “The high social costs implicated in a currency's devaluation in developing countries explains why some countries look on their currency's appreciation with benign indifference and even increase the likelihood of Dutch disease in their economies when the international financial market conditions are right” (Mántey, 2010: 176).

The US economist Robert Triffin foresaw the result of the excess in the United States’ foreign liabilities, by establishing that central banks of other countries would start to exchange their dollars for gold. In 1960, Triffin produced a report on the international financial system which contains the following concept known as the Triffin dilemma:

“If the United States stopped running balance of payments deficits, the international community would lose its largest source of additions to reserves. The resulting shortage of liquidity could draw the world economy into a contractionary spiral leading to instability. If the US deficits continued, a steady stream of dollars would continue to fuel world economic growth. However, excessive US deficits (a dollar glut) would erode confidence in the value of the US dollar. Without confidence in the dollar, it would no longer be accepted as the world's reserve currency. The fixed exchange rate system could break down, leading to instability.”1 (Triffin, 2006, 1960: 45).

With this outlook, Triffin proposed the creation of new reserve units which would not depend on gold or national currencies, but solely add liquidity to the whole world. The creation of this new unit would allow the United States to cut its balance of payments deficit while also allowing for global economic growth. These ideas are still relevant today given the endless consequences of the crisis that officially began in October 2008 and which still have no likely conclusion in sight, and also since emerging countries are increasingly assigned the main responsibility of remedying this crisis –particularly by increasing of international reserves, raising excess global liquidity, the strengthening of their currencies (which allows lowering international prices) and intensifies unfair global competition between them and harms their internal economies.

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MONETARY RESERVES ( ...continuation )

In broad terms we can define the main challenge facing the global system of reserves in three ways, each based on the existence of a national currency (the US dollar) being used as a global reserve unit.2 The first is why adjustments are made by countries running international deficits rather than surpluses; countries with current account deficits must consume less and save less, while surplus countries must consume more and save more.3 Essentially this all comes down to the fact that this applies to all countries except the United States, which can finance its deficits with its national currency which at the same time is the international unit of account. The second problem is that international monetary policy, and therefore the value of the global unit of account, is dependent on the US macroeconomic policy. In other words, its currency responds to its economic cycles that are in turn reflected in the volumes of its balance of payments deficits and its counterpart, national deficits. And thirdly, “developing countries are forced to transfer wealth to countries which have the strongest currencies, mainly the dollar, by concentrating their reserves in said currencies”. (Ocampo, 2009: 1).

An international currency must fulfill a basic criterion: stability. And over time the dollar is growing more unstable, and is increasingly far removed from its status as the all-conquering currency of forty years ago, when it was established as the international unit of reference. The fixed exchange-rate system relied on two determining factors: the dollar's stability (a stable dollar meant a continuing equilibrium in the United States’ balance of payments) and a double asymmetry whereby surplus countries would not be forced to correct their imbalance, thus expanding their growth and, simultaneously, the US would not be obliged to make adjustments for imbalances: as the country of the reserve currency, it could finance its imbalances with its own currency.

The United States’ economic cycles are reflected in its twin deficits and the clearly increasing value of gold, affecting the volumes and value of dollar reserves kept by all countries as part of their monetary underpinnings. Figure 1 shows the trend of the United States’ deficits, both in its current account and its budget deficit, expressed in dollars.

Figure 2 shows the fluctuation in the price per ounce of gold in US dollars, from 1980 until 2010. This Figure was prepared using two scales, the scale on the right shows the percentage variation of the price of gold in dollars, reflecting the currency's volatility. And on the left, the scale shows –in dollar units and in absolute units– how the price of gold has increased by us$1,113 between 2000 and 2010. Yet from 1990 to 2000, its price fell by us$104.

Figure 1. United States’ federal deficit and current account 1980-2010
(us$ billion)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from ihs, Global Insight (2010).

THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MONETARY RESERVES ( ...continuation )

Figure 2. Price of gold, 1980-2010 (US dollars and percentage variation)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from ihs, Global Insight (2010).

CENTRAL BANKS’ DEMAND FOR INTERNATIONAL RESERVES

Central banks demand currencies and accumulate them on the basis of their general monetary policy, taking into account their level of global integration to make efficient use of their international assets (ir*) and to respond to their trade and financial commitments. These ir must essentially be managed to minimize or correct any trade imbalances. Theoretically, the issuing institution will demand currencies for various reasons, and which may be described as follows:

  1. For liquidity: to support the national currency and guarantee the payment of foreign obligations, which helps improve the perception of the country's risk and also improve the conditions under which the country can access international markets;
  2. As a precaution: to protect the country against possible speculative attacks on its currency or debts, as well as external shocks to the current and capital account, which helps improve its credibility and hence the effectiveness of monetary policy; and
  3. finally, for profitability: to increase profits through a more efficient management of investments in international reserves, which must be invested in bonds that are highly liquid.

There are currently some interesting aspects to the study of the volume of ir which various economies must possess: a) The amount of reserves is a pool of external assets, considered as an inventory problem. b) Monetary reserves provide liquidity services in currencies. c) The main benefit of ir is as a precautionary measure, in other words, as insurance. d) However, various costs are associated with acquiring and maintaining an ir balance. e) Some analytical models on the optimality of ir also reflect various states of integration into the international markets and the sources of variability in the balance of payments.

MONETARY RESERVES BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES

For emerging countries, one result of the international crisis has been the capturing of global excess liquidity, given the differentiation of real interest rates between such countries and developed nations: “in developing countries, due to the weakness in their balances of payments, real investment decisions are not only taken with an eye on the projects’ profitability and the interest rate in their local currency, but in comparison to the anticipated performances of assets denominated in foreign currency” (Mantey, 2010: 175). This is reflected in the constant increase in monetary reserves to maintain high economic expectations with price stability. Therefore, in 1990, developed countries held international reserves that were the equivalent of 3% of their gdp, whereas in 2009 this ratio was just 6%; on the other hand, the reserves of developing or emerging countries represented 8% of their gdp in 1990, but in 2009 this ratio was 36% of their gdp, in ir, Figure 3.

Figure 3. International reserves as a percentage of gdp by groups of countries
(percentages)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from unctadstat (2010).

Currently the policy of ir accumulation being implemented by the central banks of emerging Latin American countries is clearly as a precautionary measure; in other words, their central aim is to protect themselves from banking and financial crises similar to those of the 1990s which triggered a collapse in the exchange-rate fixing, contributing to a change in the monetary paradigm that led to these countries using floating exchange rates determined by market forces,4 within the framework of a monetary policy of inflation targeting. This type of inflationary control, even when a floating exchange rate is repeatedly announced, actually involves the monetary authorities’ active intervention, and therefore it must be accepted that the exchange rate is subordinate to the policy of price stability and a type of actively controlled or managed floating exchange rate specified. See Figure 4.

Figure 4. International reserves and exchange rate for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 1995-2009
($US billion and local currency per dollar)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from each country's central banks

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON
OPTIMAL INTERNATIONAL RESERVE LEVELS

Various vulnerability or early warning indicators exist to determine the ir level. The most well-known are: the ir/import ratio, which was the rule traditionally followed by central banks for several years until it fell into disuse after Bretton Woods system ended, and was proposed by Robert Triffin (1947); according to this rule, the central bank must maintain its reserve levels at the equivalent of three or four months of imports; other examples include the relationship of ir between a fraction of the M2 monetary aggregate, as well as the ir/short-term external debt. Vulnerability indicators are generally classified as follows:

Of these composite indicators, we should draw attention to the ratio of reserves to short-term debt, known as the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, which states that “countries should hold liquid reserves equal to their foreign liabilities coming due within a year” (Rodrik, 2006: 5). Currently this is the main early-warning indicator, used to evaluate possession of monetary assets. Since it was announced by Pablo Guidotti (Argentina's former Minister of Finance) and when it was picked up again by the Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States, it rapidly became popular. “the rule of a level of reserves equal to short-term debt should be viewed as a starting point for analyzing reserve adequacy for a country with significant but uncertain access to capital markets” (Mulder & Metzgen, 2001: 67).

Guzmán & Padilla (2003: 176) show the importance of this ratio and its superiority over other indicators of vulnerability; such is its importance that the International Monetary Fund (imf) has incorporated this coefficient as one of its indicators; but the limits to this quotient are also explained, for example: the divergent methodologies used by each country limits comparisons; observations of this variable are published several months after the date in question and in various countries the external debt is only published on an annual basis. “This complicates the analysis and research, especially given the important financial innovations of recent years, the Guidotti-Greenspan rule should be a variable used for a joint analysis” (Ruiz, 2011: 29). The equation for the optimal level is:

ir* = ir = 95% of STD

where:

ir* = Optimal international reserves

ir = Total amount of reserves

STD = Short-term external debt

There are also various models to estimate the optimal demand for international reserves (ir*), most of which are more complex than the aforementioned early-warning indicators. Some of them are described by Ruiz (2011) and Palacios (2007).

The Wijnholds-Kapteyn methodology (w-k). This methodology (see Wijnholds & Kapteyn, 2001) is an extension of the Guidotti-Greenspan rule; it is a model that proposes incorporating capital flight of residents in a given country in order to estimate the optimal level of foreign currency assets; its authors suggest setting an optimal reserve level that combines internal capital flights with external flights. Some authors call this the Wijnholds-Kapteyn-Triffin model (for example Palacios, 2007: 120) since at the time of estimating the ir* they incorporate the 3 or 4 months of imports as proposed by Triffin, with the aim of factoring in the continuity of international payments.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON
OPTIMAL INTERNATIONAL RESERVE LEVELS ( ...continuation )

As variables, this model uses external short-term debt as a percentage of the M2 monetary aggregate (which must be in the range of 10 to 20% of the total of the M2 for the fixed exchange rate for flexible parity). This percentage of M2 is incorporated in order to prevent capital flights; and this fraction must also be adjusted by country risk. Therefore, Wijnholds-Kapteyn give the following equation to calculate the optimal reserve level:

ir* = (STD) + ( α ⋅ CR)

where:

ir* = Optimal international reserves

STD = Short-term external debt

α = Fraction of M2

CR = Country risk

INDICATORS AND MODELS TO DETERMINE OPTIMAL LEVELS
OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES

The following is an empirical analysis of four emerging Latin American economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, between 1995 and 2009, which according to our analysis have followed policies of accumulation of foreign currencies for precautionary reasons. The first premise is that there is a direct correlation between said policy and the determination to maintain a specific (or stable) exchange rate, which helps them manage inflation pass-through; the second is that monetary reserves spiraled after the 2007-2008 period, due to a strong depreciation of these currencies; therefore the central banks increasingly tended to acquire foreign currencies to sustain their respective exchange rates. Each of these countries established specific policies to deal with the crisis, but generally there was an open intervention in managing the exchange rate, as an attempt to handle the high levels of global uncertainty. This involved increasing their reserves, despite the opportunity cost that this represented for their economies, given the differentiation of real interest rates. 5

In these four Latin American countries there is evidence of an increasing and accelerating accumulation of foreign currencies at the end of the 1990s, but the increase was greatest after 2007, as a means of mitigating the crisis. We can also see a clear inverse relationship between the increase in these foreign currency reserves and the stability of the countries’ exchange rate.

Even though the Latin American economies in question have implemented specific economic policies in response to their economic cycles and situations, generally they show analogous results in regards the accumulation of international assets under the concept of precautionary international reserves, as a way and means of managing speculations on the value of their exchange rates, avoiding inflation pass-through at the level of their internal prices, and attempting to handle short-term capital flight.

INDICATORS AND MODELS TO DETERMINE OPTIMAL LEVELS
OF INTERNATIONAL RESERVES ( ...continuation )

Figure 5 shows the result of the average ratio of international reserves to quarterly imports, using Triffin's methodology. The first result is that the average ratio of reserves to imports between 1995-2009 is by a factor of three to four, in other words, international reserves cover three to four times the value of imported goods and services for each of these countries. Since 2008, this ratio has noticeably increased: in each of the countries the ratio has increased by between two and three percentage points. Brazil is the most extreme case. In the second quarter of 2009 its [international reserves] reached the equivalent of 6.87 months of its imports. This is explained both by the reduction in international trade and by its increasingly large volume of international reserves.

Figure 5. International reserves / import ratio (selected countries). 1995-2009
International reserves, excl. gold
(Months of imports)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from inegi, indec, ine and ibge and the central
banks of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.

In terms of the ir to short-term debt ratio, shown in Figure 6, Argentina, Chile and Brazil maintained the quotient stable during most of the period; Mexico is the exception, for it has increased its level of ir since 2005. This implies that the short-term debt has reduced in relative terms in each country, since as a counterpart they have set about shoring up their international finances with real increases in their international reserves.

Figure 6. Monetary reserves / short-term debt ratio of four Latin American countries. 1995-2008
(us$ billion)
Source: Compiled by authors using data from global development indicators, World Bank (2010).

APPLYING THE w-k MODEL TO SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES

The w-k model is a means of assessing the volume of international reserves held by a central bank, trying to take into account international financial conditions since it factors into its calculation key variables such as short-term debt and country risk,6 which is the weighting that multiplies the M2 fractions (in this case 5% and 10%, given that each country has a floating exchange rate policy). It is interesting to note this model because it reflects in some way the unfavorable situation facing each of these emerging economies. The precise result shows that the four countries exceed the level considered to be optimal. (Table 2, Figures 7a and 7b).

The result is basically explained by the country risk factor which is calculated as the difference between the rate of each country's federal reserves and those of the United States. In other words, the rate differential that emerging countries must offer through international capital flows. The resulting data is revealing in several ways: firstly, there is a marked change in the policy of reserve accumulation since 2007 due to the fact that the crisis at that time added reasons to manage ir levels in the face of a possible speculative attack; secondly, a clear increase is visible both in the reserves calculated as being optimal for those years, explained by the increase in the M2 monetary aggregate, as well as the country risk that these economies had to weather during the global financial crisis. In other words, the central banks of the countries in question intervened indirectly in the foreign exchange markets by actively using their respective monetary reserves, which is consistent with a floating exchange rate policy adopted by these four countries; however, this mechanism is used to avoid inflation pass-through (Table 2).

Figure 7a. International reserves and optimal demand of international assets
Argentina and Chile, 1995-2009
(Annual balances and forecasts in us$ billions)
Source: Estimates of authors based on data from each country's central bank, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and cepal.

Figure 7b .International reserves and optimal demand of international reserves Brazil and Mexico, 1995-2009
(Annual balances and forecasts in us$ billions)
Source: Estimates of authors based on data from each country's central bank, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and cepal.

APPLYING THE w-k MODEL TO SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES ( ...continuation )

When estimating the optimal demand of international reserves for the aforementioned countries, the “Wijnholds-Kapteyn methodology is shown to have a serious limitation, since the short-term debt (STD) figure is only published annually, whereas ideally the observations would be available each month to help analyze the situation. Another drawback is the fact that the same STD data is released with a delay of almost one year after the date in question.” (Ruiz, 2011: 80).

CONCLUSIONS
  • The US dollar's instability, as a result of the United States’ extraordinary twin deficits, in conjunction with global excess liquidity and the differentiation between interest rates around the world, show that the international monetary system must be transformed, moving beyond the use of national currencies (the dollar) as a unit of exchange and global reserve currency, since any national currency will respond to its own economic cycle and over time they cease to be stable currencies. This has led to an accumulation of international reserves by semi-industrialized countries, at a high financial cost and in detriment of their real economic growth.

  • The historically costly volumes of reserves held by emerging countries is in response to a policy of managing expectancies to sustain predefined exchange rates, and thus attempt to control inflation pass-through, given that these countries are committed to developing monetary policies known as inflation targeting.

  • The Latin American countries in question adopted floating exchange rates and attempted to use them as a control against external shocks. But in fact, regardless of their lines of argument consistently in favor of their currencies being priced by the international market, financial and monetary authorities intervene indirectly on said market through their international reserves, for example with: “1) hidden operations such as lines of credit, loans on futures markets or foreign-currency-denominated debt used to defend the rate against speculative pressures and 2) direct interventions with reserves and interest rate movements” (Téllez, 2004: 100).

  • The countries in question, similarly to other emerging economies are accumulating monetary reserves at unprecedented levels; the drawback is that they are backing up their respective currencies instead of sustaining them through production. This constrains productive capacity and employment in their countries.

  • Although the optimality models provide first-hand information, they cannot be used across the board. Nor can the decisions on handling international reserves be based solely on quantitative analyses; qualitative criteria defined in terms of each country's economic objectives must be considered. Optimal demand models and early-warning indicators only provide partial information, and therefore must be used cautiously and in the understanding that they just offer guidance to those in charge of economic policy. As such they must not be the exclusive criteria to be considered when defining the guidelines of the monetary asset accumulation policy; nevertheless, emerging nations should ideally place a limit on the massive inflows of capital into their economies.
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* Researcher at the Economic Research Institute, National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas–unam-iiec). Email: patrod@unam.mx. My thanks to student Araceli Morales Manzo from the Economics Faculty for her help researching statistical and bibliographical information.

** Author of the thesis Aspectos teóricos y empíricos de las dimensiones de reservas internacionales del Banco de México. 1994-2009, Economics Faculty-unam. Email: omar.googolplex@gmail.com

1 In August 1971, President Richard Nixon announced the end to the convertibility between US dollars and gold, placed a 10% tariff on imported goods, and reduced foreign aid by 10%. By breaking with the existing link between dollar and gold, the system was abandoned and all other currencies linked to the value of gold were floating. In 1973, the decision was taken for a widespread floating of currencies, and increases in movements of capital no longer permit a return to fixed exchange rates. (González, 2002: 53).

2 According to Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, a research paper produced by the Bank for International Settlements (2010), 84% of financial transactions are made in US dollars.

3 “If a country has a current account deficit it can be financed through the acquisition of fixed or financial assets from foreigners or through a reduction in reserves. A current account surplus, meanwhile, implies that the country finances other countries through an increase in its international reserves or the acquisition of foreign assets by nationals. The current account also equals the country's net lending to foreigners. Unlike a closed economy, an open economy can save by domestic and foreign investment. National saving therefore equals domestic investment plus the current account balance.”. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2006: 323).

4 Switching to a flexible exchange rate is theoretically a protection against external shocks, defining real interest rates, as well as the mechanisms for managing external capital. But Latin American economies in turn joined in global trade, therefore the growth of complete economic sectors competes with international prices, hence their currency reserves become another means of managing inflation control expectancies.

5 This is made clear with the decisions recently taken by central banks in the countries in question: Argentina applies the most controls on the demand for currencies. A sliding exchange rate with a managed floating regime, depreciation against the dollar: by 12.5% between September 1 and December 3 2008. On March 30, 2009, the central institute established a pre-agreement for a currency swap deal with the Central Bank of China in the region of us$10 billion; this would operate as a contingency measure to strengthen the position of the reserves held by the issuing institution. Restrictions were also announced on imports in sensitive national industrial sectors. Brazil's Central Bank announced that it was prepared to use up to us$36 billion of monetary reserves for loans to companies experiencing difficulties in refinancing debt on the foreign market. Chile announced a tender of us$5 billion for a currency swap (1 to 6 months). Similarly, measures are being taken to improve the coverage of bank loans for exporters and the expedited return of vat credits to exporters.
In order to reduce exchange-rate volatility, Banco de México (Mexico's Central Bank) directly intervened in the market through extraordinary sales of just over us$1 billion. It also applied for the process of the dollar auction and placed us$400 million using a mechanism set up jointly by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público–shcp) and the Banco de México, from February 3 to 6, 2009. These direct interventions will continue in the event of continuing international financial volatility. Banco de México set up a swap deal worth us$30 billion with the Federal Reserve.


6 In this case the country risk was calculated by calculating the difference between the reference rate of each country and that of the United States.